Bad Policy, not just Bad Intelligence
I'm swayed by <a href="http://www.tpmcafe.com/story/2005/11/14/23121/761">Yglesias</a>. Even if Saddam did have nuclear weapons, the best thing to solve that crisis was to have the UN inspectors continue with their work. Especially when the intelligence we did have was so shaky. The UN inspectors were finding out that there was no active weapons program during the winter and spring of 2003. This was taken as a sign that inspections were not working, because they did not fit the expectations of the hawks in the administration.
The Nigerian documents we received from the Italians that Bush based his Jan. 2003 State of the Union claims on were considered to be highly dubiuous by the State Dept., the CIA and the FBI at that time. If that is not an example of ignoring evidence that does not fit your desired outcome, I don't know what is.
I'm afraid that in all the shouting about who knew what and how and by twisting which arms, we are forgetting a crucial lesson from all of this: preemptive war is a losing strategy.
I still remember my shock in Oct. of 2002 (Nov.?) that the Senate -- The Senate! -- was giving the administration the A-OK for war in Iraq.
I think that intelligence was lacking in the intelligence field here.
The consequences of a rocket attack are smaller than a full-fledged invasion, so the threshold for reacting to intelligence might indeed be lower. Still sounds like "shoot first, ask questions later".
I don't think the Sudan attack was accidental. We hit the target we intended. Targeted. No troops. Little cost. Accurate.
It was the intelligence that was bad...
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